The benefits of dual apprenticeship programs are usually discussed in the context of reducing structural unemployment rates, especially among the young. Related to this, the long-run benefits of dual apprenticeship programs are extensively analyzed in the literature. However, empirical evidence regarding the short-run effects of the business cycle on the number of apprenticeships is scarce. In this paper, we use panel-data at the German federal states level ranging from 1999 through 2012 to analyze the effects of the business cycle on the number of new apprenticeship contracts. Using different sample periods and model specifications, we do not find a robust and significant effect of the business cycle on apprenticeships. Hence, the apprenticeship system seems to dampen the volatility of youth unemployment.
Introduction
While the economic literature extensively investigates the role of skill acquisition in the context of long-run economic growth, the short-run relation between the business cycle and skill-acquisition is much less understood (see e.g. Méndez and Sepúlveda 2012) .
In this paper, we focus on one particular way of skill acquisition, namely the dualapprenticeship system, which is a market-driven form at the upper-secondary school level. In this system apprentices have a contract with a firm and receive training both at school and at the firm. Therefore, the number of new apprenticeship contracts depends on the number of school graduates that are looking for an apprenticeship and the number of apprenticeship contracts offered by firms. This form of education is mainly present in countries from Continental and Northern Europe such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. The influence of the business cycle on the number of apprenticeship programs is a research question of high policy relevance for countries where these programs play an important role. In countries like Germany, Austria or Switzerland, at least half of primary and secondary school graduates start an apprenticeship program. Thus, a large part of the young people in education can potentially be affected by movements in output growth and the level of unemployment.
Our research is also of interest for countries, where dual-apprenticeships are less common. For example, dual-apprenticeship systems are nearly absent in Southern European countries as well as in the UK and Ireland. Given that many of these countries are struggling with high unemployment rates especially among the young, the EU Commission (see e.g. European Commission 2012) advocates the implementation of apprenticeship programs in these countries, based among others on the idea that such programs help lower structural and cyclical unemployment among young people.
Since firms are naturally exposed to the business cycle, the number of apprenticeship contracts they offer may depend on the economic stance. However, the sign of the relation is far from clear. It will be positive if firms reduce the number of apprenticeship contracts along with overall employment in a recession. Moreover, labor contract regulation is normally stricter than for usual employees. A firm can only terminate a training contract unilaterally for economic reasons. As a consequence, firms might be reluctant to hire an apprentice if the business or economic stance is bad or if business expectations are poor. On the other hand, the relation between the business cycle and the number of apprenticeship contracts could also be negative, because apprentices constitute a cheap low-skilled labor input for firms that might substitute for other unskilled workers in a recession. In addition, hiring and training an apprentice can be seen as an investment by the firm. For example, firms might expect that the economy will have recovered by the time the apprenticeship ends. In addition, apprentices may carry out parts of skilled as well as unskilled work, which gives the firm flexibility in assigning tasks to apprentices. Therefore, it is conceivable that output volatility can show either a positive or a negative effect on the number of apprenticeship contracts.
The literature review by Brunello (2009) shows that the number of offered apprenticeship contracts is usually lower during a recession. This implies that the decision on the number of offered apprenticeship contracts is not qualitatively different from the general recruitment strategy of firms (see e.g. Lindley 1975, Brunello and Medio 2001) . Several papers investigating different countries provide empirical evidence that an economic downturn or periods of high unemployment lead to a lower number of offered apprenticeship positions. Switzerland. However, business cycle effects on apprenticeship training tend to be weaker than on overall labor demand.
Our aim is to empirically investigate the sign of the average effect of the business cycle on apprenticeship contracts for Germany. In our empirical analysis, we use data on newly offered and concluded apprenticeship contracts at the level of the 16 German states from 1999 through 2012. The federalistic nature of the German education system makes such an analysis reasonable, since demographic developments, the industry structure and also business cycles can vary considerably across the states. Based on the panel structure of our data, our findings show that the estimated effect from income growth and unemployment on the number of apprenticeship contracts is weak and hardly significant. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of the German apprenticeship system and compares it briefly to other countries. Section 3 describes the data set used and the methodology for our estimations. The results of our estimations are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion.
The German Apprenticeship System
In Germany, vocational training is attained by completing one of more than 300 programs of officially recognized occupations in order to gain all competence of a skilled worker in that field. In general, around one half of school graduates start vocational training each year (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) 2013a, Statistisches Bundesamt 2013).
There are three notable elements that make the German dual-apprenticeship system special in an international context. One element is the corporate organization of the system: the state, unions and employers jointly decide on the principles of apprenticeship. Second, the education is dual, meaning that it consists of school-based and firm-based training elements. The third element is the vocationalism of the system, i.e. the accumulation of occupation-specific knowledge and skills. An apprenticeship system with these characteristics is described as collectivistic, see e.g. Ebner and Nikolai (2010) . Austria and Switzerland have established similar systems as Germany.
The corporate organization is reflected in nationwide standardization of programs concerning content and duration. Duration ranges from two to four years. The share of firms fulfilling the requirements for dual-apprenticeship training is at a constant level of about 59 % of German firms. The number of firms actively participating in apprenticeship training was substantially lower in 2012 with a share of 31 % of all firms, see e.g.
Hartung (2012).
The duality of the concept is the core element of vocational formation in Germany.
Every dual apprenticeship is based on a private-law contract between the apprentice and the training firm for the apprenticeship. The contract automatically terminates with completion of the training. The apprentices receive a standardized salary that varies between different professions and sectors. During the course of an apprenticeship, trainees switch between learning in vocational schools, which covers about 40 % of the total training time, and working periods in the firm. During in-firm periods the trainees undergo practical training and gather firm-specific knowledge (Biavaschi et al. 2012) . All apprenticeships end with a final exam issued by a central federal committee board. A firm's decision to employ apprentices depends on the benefits and costs of training an apprentice. First, as trainees are skilled workers by the end of the apprenticeship, firms can meet their need of specialized personnel over a medium-term time horizon.
In other words, apprenticeship helps to satisfy firms' demand for skilled workers and thereby retains their competitiveness. Second, training costs are an important factor as well. There are, apart from providing the vocational schooling, no governmental subsidies for the training firms. Smaller firms face positive net costs from training due to larger relative costs of providing workspace for apprentices. Still, some firms face negative net costs, since apprentices' wages are low compared to regular wages. Therefore, trainees might be hired even if firms have no demand for specialists (Niederalt 2004) . Moreover, vocational training gives firms the opportunity to screen possible future employees who additionally have gathered firm-specific knowledge.
Trainees have incentives to participate in the German apprenticeship system since it provides the chance to cross the "first barrier" in the labour market more easily. Due to the concept of vocationalism, apprentices are fully qualified workers by the end of their training. This is a key factor for a gradual transfer from school to employment and for long-run employment. According to Reinberg and Hummel (2005) participating in vocational training considerably reduces the risk of unemployment. Fedorets and SpitzOener (2011) show that human capital accumulated during vocational training is even transferable between different occupations, so vocationalism does not inhibit flexibility.
The German apprenticeship market is closely connected with the regular labor market.
About 66 % of successful apprentices stay in the same firm, in which they completed their apprenticeship. This can be seen as an indicator for a smooth transition from education to regular employment (Hartung 2012) . On the other hand, young adults with poor school reports have severe problems to enter the labor market, since training firms recruit by market criteria and demand has regularly exceeded supply of apprenticeship contracts in recent years (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) 2013b).
Data and Methodology
Our methodology closely resembles the one in Mühlemann et al. (2009) and uses standard panel data methods to analyze the determinants of apprenticeship contracts at the regional level. Using firm-level data might be interesting for the analysis of sector spectific features. However, in this paper, we focus on the relation between aggregate variables.
The data we use consists of yearly information on offered apprenticeship contracts offered from businesses between 1999 and 2012 from all 16 German federal states. Additionally, for each state, we consider two variables related to the business cycle: the unemployment rate and the growth rate of regional real income. In addition, we control for demographic effects by considering demographic variables like the population of school leavers at age 16 and the number of first-year students. Descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in table 1. rates remained on high levels and started to decrease thereafter. In our estimations, we take these data characteristics into account by analysing corresponding sub-samples and sub-groups. a it to the growth rate of real income ∆y i,t−1 and to the unemployment rate u it is
where i indexes the federal state, i = 1, 2, . . . , 16, and t indexes the year, t = 1, 2, . . . , 14.
The variable c i accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among the federal states. It is constant over time and may be correlated with income growth. For example, the c i 's capture heterogeneity in the economic structures of the states. The vector x it comprises demographic variables that might be correlated with the business cycle and that have an impact on the number of apprenticeship contracts. Variation in the error-term ε it stems from changes in the educational framework in federal state i in year t, which are not correlated with the business cycle and not autocorrelated (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002 ).
To meet concerns about the timing of the variables, we use the previous year's growth rate of real income in our regressions. New apprenticeship contracts are closed some time before the usual start of the training year on the first of August. Therefore, we use the previous year's growth rate of real income as an indicator for the business cycle in the beginning of the following year when, presumably, firms and apprentices form their decisions on new apprenticeship contracts.
In equation (1) the coefficient θ measures the ceteris paribus percentage change of apprenticeship contracts that is due to an increase in income growth by one percentage point and δ measures the ceteris paribus effect of a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. To obtain consistent estimates for θ and δ and to justify standard statistical inference, the regressors in (1) have to be strictly exogenous given the unobserved effect c i , meaning that once ∆y i,t−1 , u it , x it and c i are controlled for, ∆y i,s−1 , u is and x is have no partial effects on a it for s = t. Strict exogeneity in terms of the errors can be stated as
Since we allow for state specific effects to capture unobserved fixed effects, we consider strong exogeneity a justifiable assumption in our model. Table 2 summarizes estimation results for different specifications of our empirical model
Results
(1). While the specifications in columns (1) to (3) of table 2 include only business cycle variables, the regression presented in the last column is augmented with demographic ' * ' (' * * ',' * * * ') indicates statistical significance at 10% (5%, 1%).
Conclusion
This paper has analysed the short-run reaction of apprenticeship programs offered by businesses to business cycle variables. Panel-data have been used for the German federal states ranging from 1999 to 2012 to show that the impact of business cycle fluctuations on the number of new apprenticeship contracts is weak and hardly significant on average. Hence, the apprenticeship system seems to have dampened the volatility of youth unemployment in Germany. We also document the importance of demographic variables in explaining the number of apprenticeship contracts.
